


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Commercialization of Government Funded R&D: Follow-up Research Survey on NEDO Research Projects

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Summary

This paper draws on data obtained from a questionnaire survey conducted for the 242 private R&D projects supported by NEDO (New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization), Japan's public management organization promoting R&D, to explore how dependence on government support affects processes of private R&D projects and, in turn, the performance and commercialization of developed technologies.

Our analyses show that projects receiving more than a half of their entire R&D expenditures from NEDO tend to be isolated from in-house departments. Such isolation, derived mainly from the projects' unique positions in "double dependence" structures, negatively affects project performance, especially those related to commercialization, in two ways.

First, high dependence on government resources prevents project members from interacting with people outside the project within the company. This inhibits project members from effectively leveraging internal resources - both technological and human - to overcome technological problems. Secondly, such high dependence weakens internal controls over project activities. This causes delayed development of marketable technologies and makes it difficult for projects to achieve justification for further investment required for commercialization.

Our findings suggest that for successful R&D leading to commercialization, both companies and public funding agencies should encourage projects to maintain close relationships with other internal departments.

1. Performance of Government Funding for R&D activities in Private Sectors

Although government support for private R&D has exhibited a downward trend in countries around the world in recent years, including a reduction in the US military budget, for example, such support remains at a scale that cannot be ignored. In Japan, for example, nearly 20% of the 19 trillion yen in R&D expenditures by the private sector was supported with government funding in 2008 [1].

For many countries, innovation that will create economic values has become a vital issue as the maturation of various industries accelerates in tandem with increasingly severe global competition. Given such circumstances, in recent years there has been no lack of instances in which government funding has flowed not only into basic research, but into applied research and product development that will lead to commercialization as well.

In the United States the Bayh-Dole Act, which was enacted in 1980 and enables firms to retain ownership of the results from government funded R&D, is said to have accelerated R&D undertaken by private firms with government support and commercialization of the R&D results. In response to this change, the so-called "Japanese-version Bayh-Dole Act" (Act on Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization, Article 30) was enacted in Japan as well in 1989, making it easier for firms to receive government support for the development of technology that differentiates their products in the market.

On the other hand, as the fiscal condition in each country is tight, the use of public funds is being subjected to sharp public scrutiny. The merits of such uses are especially easy to question when public funds are lavished on R&D in a way that encourages commercialization at specific firms.

Under such conditions, it is no longer possible to steer around questions asking "Does government funding really promote private R&D activities?" and "Why should we be spending our tax money on private sector activity?" when deciding appropriate government funding measures. Among existing research there are many studies that have attempted to quantitatively clarify the effects of government funding at the industry and national levels [2], [3], [4]. On the other hand, there is little research from a micro-economic viewpoint that looks specifically at which processes are followed by projects that receive government funding to produce results. To use public funds effectively, however, it is necessary to understand not only the results at the macro level, but to also supplement such understanding with an analysis of the specific processes by which projects that receive government funding achieve their results.

Particularly when government support extends even to applied research and product development, and the results from development belong to a specific firm, determining whether firms are able to create new businesses from R&D and create economic values becomes an important factor for measuring the effects of government funding. From this perspective as well, research on the project level management is needed.

Investigating the project management of government-funded R&D also raises several theoretical questions since it is distinct from those of ordinal private sector R&D projects.

Government funding is significant in promoting R&D that, despite its importance, tends to suffer from underinvestment if left to the private sector [5], [6]. By liberating R&D activity from the severe and short-term profit pressures at profit-seeking enterprises, government funding has an effect of promoting R&D with a long-term view.

For that very reason, however, the commercialization incentives could be inhibited for R&D projects that are isolated from the selection process within private firms. With public institutions that support R&D as well, some doubt remains - despite project evaluations being conducted by teams of experts - as to whether such institutions are capable of making appropriate assessments concerning the possibility of

commercialization. Moreover, projects might be isolated organizationally or professionally from other departments, and the ability to exchange information within the firm obstructed, as a result of receiving government funding. There is also a possibility the use of human and technical resources within a company will be restricted due to such isolation. Differing from typical R&D projects at private firms, government funded R&D projects need to consider these additional issues for successful development and commercialization.

Based on such an awareness of the problem, this paper seeks to empirically identify the factors that determine a success or a failure of commercializing private sector R&D activities that receive government funding, by analyzing data obtained from a follow-up questionnaire survey concerning projects supported by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) ("NEDO projects") in Japan. NEDO, under the direction of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), provides support for private sector R&D activity with a particular emphasis on economic results. The authors believe this will provide a suitable exploratory environment for measuring the effect of government funding from the point of whether commercialization is or is not pursued.

2. Existing Research

Much of the existing research has focused on the increase or decrease of R&D investment at private sectors after the receipt of public funds in order to identify the effects of public supports [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. In this approach, if R&D expenditures in private sectors were reduced by the injection of government funding, public funds would be judged to be merely an alternative to private sector capital and to have no additional effect. If the private sector was found to boost its R&D outlays, on the other hand, such funding could be judged to have an additional accelerative effect.

To begin with, however, there are problems with the idea itself of understanding the effect of government funding from the increase or decrease in private sector R&D spending [14]. For example, during an economic downturn, a firm that is experiencing a business slump and seen its spending capacity wither might have no alternative but to abandon some ongoing R&D projects even if the long-term importance of the projects is high. When government supports R&D activity that can no longer be carried out because of a business slump, even if such government funding is mere "substitution" and is available only temporarily, this is an effective alternative for encouraging private R&D activity.

Conversely, there might also be some instances where a private firm looks to government funding simply to play technological catch-up with competitors, even though it has no strong intention of commercializing its R&D results. In other cases, public funds might be allocated to projects that have not been approved internally because of researchers' specific interests. In such instances, it is difficult to say the public funds were used effectively even if private firms' R&D expenditures were maintained or increased. This is all the more true if patents developed through a government funded project belong to a specific firm but are merely hoarded and are not commercialized.

Therefore it is necessary to ascertain, especially when providing government funding for R&D activities aimed at commercialization, whether such funding is in fact linked to commercialization and creating economic value. To do so, we must lower a unit of analysis to the individual project level and investigate the details of the R&D management.

With this respect, some existing studies have looked at the relationship between government funding and performance of R&D projects at private firms [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]. These studies tend to analyze the correlation between the government funding and R&D performance by taking the presence or lack of government funding or the amount as an independent variable, and the number of patents applied or received as a dependent variable¹. These studies report that, on average, the acceptance of public funding has a positive influence on performance, although it is conditional.

Unfortunately these researches are in some respects inadequate for grasping the effects of government R&D support. First, the number of patents obtained cannot directly capture the contribution to commercialization. Even if a patent is obtained, the government funding cannot necessarily be said to have had an effect from the standpoint of creating economic value if the patent cannot be commercialized and is held idly inside the firm. Secondly, whereas the existing researches identify the relationship between the amount of government funding and the results, they do not fully clarify the causal mechanisms that produce the results.

In such contexts, this study looks at government funded projects with the goal of empirically clarifying the mechanisms that produce commercialization results, while noting the unique management issues pertaining to government funded projects.

3. Issues on Government Funded Project: Deriving Hypotheses

3.1 The problem of dual dependency

Government funding for private R&D activities is broadly divided between direct support and indirect support. The latter – indirect support – refers to tax exemption for R&D investments. The former – direct support – is further divided into "contracts" and "assistance." A "contract" is a provision of funds to procure the products and services government agencies use. "Assistance," on the other hand, is the

¹ Reference [15] examines the results of product development by looking not only at the technology but also encompassing economic indicators. Moreover, in [16], Cockburn and Henderson indirectly demonstrated the relationship between research results and the presence or absence of public funding or its amount, and also briefly discussed the mechanism leading to this result. They showed that R&D activities performed by private sector firms in cooperation with public institutions has an effect on the R&D resource allocation process and on the incentives to conduct science-level research and pure research, and that as a result it also has a positive influence on the R&D results, as shown by the number of important patents. Finally, they assumed this joint development through cooperation between private corporations and public institutions is carried out mainly under public funding.

provision of funds for the R&D activities of private sector firms, primarily in the form of grants (subsidies).

The present study looks at "assistance," and when government funding is discussed in the following sections it refers to "assistance" in this sense². Moreover, although government funding ranges from providing support for basic research for the purpose of broadly disseminating scientific knowledge to providing support for R&D activities as an economic policy aimed at immediate commercialization, the present study particularly concerns support of R&D activities for commercialization purposes.

Such government funded projects aimed at commercialization have a characteristic different from ordinal corporate R&D activity in that the R&D is placed under the dual control of both the support entity (public institution) and the receiving entity (private corporation). Because government funded projects depend on public funds, various obligations, including reporting on asset management, cost allocations and financial results, are imposed along with the requirement to evaluate the progress of the R&D activity. The actual R&D activity, on the other hand, is placed under the management of private firms. Moreover, despite being dependent on public funds and subject to progress management during the R&D phase, investments are made on the basis of the firm's independent decision-making at the commercialization stage.

Because of this dual nature, government funded projects can be thought to present the following two issues related to the promotion of development for commercialization. One is the issue of "disruption of

² In the case of Japan, the "commissioned research" system exists as an intermediate position between "contract" and "assistance." Under this system, private sector entities conduct R&D on themes determined by government agencies, with the agencies picking up the tab and the R&D results reverting to the agencies (central government). Although this system had expanded because of the global trend toward abolishing industrial subsidies and the goal of aiming at a more impartial diffusion of the results from investments of public funds, it also led to enactment of the Japanese-version Bayh-Dole Act described above once it had become clear the system was hindering commercialization incentives at commissioned firms because all of the study results belonged to the government. Today much government funding continues to be implemented by government agencies through the commission system. Because it has been possible since 1989 for firms implementing the R&D to keep the results, however, thanks to the Japanese-version Bayh-Dole Act, the current commissioned research system can be positioned as "assistance" that is closer to being grants.

exchanges of information with other in-house departments." The other is the issue of "weakened controls concerning commercial feasibility."

3.2 Disruption of exchanges of information with other in-house departments

By isolating R&D activity that is considered to be socially important from the resource allocation process at the private firms that demands strict investment profitability, even if only for a short time, government funding has the effect of ensuring the continuation of development activity. Because of this very isolation, however, there is a possibility the exchange of information with other divisions within the firm will be hampered.

Normally a condition for government funding is that equipment purchased and technical knowledge developed with government funds will be used for the project, and the leveraging facilities and knowledge to other internal activities (during the project period) is restricted. Consequently it is difficult for other in-house projects to benefit directly from the government funded project in question.

Moreover, because of the obligation to publicly disclose the details of research results in the evaluation phase, government funded projects are likely to become an "opening" through which internal information leaks outside the firm. Of course, in making the results public, a company will take sufficient care to ensure that the information does not work to its detriment in the competitive marketplace. Developed technologies also can be protected as patents³. In cases where patents will not be used effectively in the future, however, it is normal to establish the condition that the public institution will exercise the rights to the R&D results, and it is not always possible to fully ensure the avoidance of an information spillage in the future. Given such circumstances, there is certainly nothing odd if other divisions within a company have become nervous about sharing information with a government funded project. An especially

³ In Japan, the so-called Japanese-version Bayh-Dole Act is normally applied to government funded projects.

cautious response to this problem is required when a government funded project will be undertaken jointly with another company.

Moreover, when a government funded project is conducted using the centralized lab system, it is also geographically isolated from other internal R&D activities. For a government funded project under such conditions, compared with a typical internal R&D project there is a possibility the free exchange of information or joint activity with other internal divisions will be limited both organizationally and psychologically. Such limits are likely to be especially prevalent when a project is supported entirely by public funds. This is summarized as the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: The higher a project's dependence on government funding, the greater the restrictions on the exchange of information with other internal divisions.

3.3 Weakened controls concerning commercial feasibility

Government funding is significant for supplementing R&D activities in which for-profit firms, with their emphasis on profitability, would not consider investing because of high uncertainty or large risk (but which are important for developing the national economy or improving society and citizens' lives). For firms, investment profitability is enhanced and R&D project continuity is assured by the receipt of government funding.

Precisely for that reason, however, there is a possibility that checks on the business profitability of projects that receive government funding will be weakened compared with other regular internal R&D projects. Of course, the public supporting institution is also likely to evaluate the status of the project's progress including commercial feasibility. In some cases, the support will be cut off when the progress

reports are not encouraging. It is difficult to conceive of such an evaluation process accurately reflecting business profitability, however.

Because the size of the investment necessary for actual commercialization will differ from the amount required in the R&D phase, a firm will make a prudent decision after considering its own strategy and available resources. It is impossible, however, for the support entity (or auditor chosen by the support entity) to fully understand the internal circumstances of the firm, such as its corporate strategy and the resources it possesses. Therefore in many cases an evaluation by the support entity must be based on a progress report that focuses on the technology development.

Ultimately, an evaluation of the specific possibilities for commercialization must rely on the firm. There is a possibility, however, that government funded projects which depend only minimally on internal resources will not be subjected to sharp scrutiny concerning business profitability. Such projects can also easily float above the internal "horse trading" process through which the regular in-house developers struggle for their annual budget provision. This discussion can be recapitulated as the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: The higher a project's dependence on government funding, the lower the internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility.

3.4 Impact on Development Performance

Both of the two hypotheses discussed above – "disruption of exchanges of information with other in-house departments" and "weakened controls concerning commercial feasibility" – can be thought to have a negative influence on performance of government funded R&D projects.

First the disruption of information exchanges with other in-house departments may have the negative impact on the technical problem-solving activities. In the process of problem solving, other internal R&D activities and past experience are exploited in no small way. Limiting access to the ample technical, human, and information resources that have been accumulated internally will most likely work to the disadvantage of progress in resolving technical problems. Conversely, a project that has achieved an effective use of internal resources, despite of its high dependence on government funding, can thought to be more likely to produce higher technological performance. This leads to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3-1: The greater the exchange of information with individuals in other internal divisions, the greater the technological development performance of a project.

Frequent communications with other people within the company has another effect – it also increases the likelihood of commercialization of the project results. Unlike in the development phase, significant internal resources must be mobilized for commercialization. For this purpose, it is necessary not only to plead the significance of the technological results but also to obtain broad agreement within the company from various viewpoints, including the profitability of the business, the future prospects for the technology and the contribution to the firm's long-term strategy [20]. Frequent communication with other internal divisions during the R&D phase is thought to be effective in obtaining such mutual consent. The reason is that helping the various internal people to understand the details and prospects of the technological development from an early stage can lead to acquiring legitimacy in the commercialization phase. This is summarized as the following hypothesis. Hypothesis 3-2: Acquiring legitimacy for commercialization of a project is easier when there is frequent exchange of information with other internal divisions over the term of the project.

On the other hand "weakened controls concerning commercial feasibility," the second issue surrounding government funded projects, is thought to first influence the problem solving activities related to mass production and cost issues. In order to commercialize the developed technology, it must clear the problems of mass production, including ease of manufacture and cost when embodied as a product. If controls on feasibility grow lax, however, a project can focus purely on technical breakthroughs and problem solving (which is likely to enhance the technological performance), but there is a possibility the mass production and cost problems will be relatively downplayed. Conversely, project members are likely to proceed with development while conscious of mass production requirements, if the internal checks for feasibility are performed.

Furthermore, the continuous involvement of other internal divisions concerning feasibility is believed to have a positive influence on the acquisition of legitimacy for commercialization. This is because the checks on commercial feasibility that have been performed from the R&D phase, with the exchange of information regarding feasibility, are tied to obtaining internal consent concerning commercialization of the developed technology. The above discussion can be summarized as the following two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 4-1: The greater the internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility, the greater the progress in resolving cost problems.

Hypothesis 4–2: The greater the internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility, the easier it is for commercialization of a project to acquire legitimacy.

Finally, as already suggested by the above hypotheses, the three performance indicators, "technological performance," "acquisition of legitimacy" and "resolution of cost problems," are each thought to improve the feasibility of commercialization of a project's results. This can be summarized as the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5: Technological results, acquisition of legitimacy and resolution of cost problems each increase the possibility of commercialization of the technology a project has developed.

The analytical framework showing a synthesis of the above hypotheses is provided in Fig. 1 below. Beginning from the following section we will proceed with a specific data analysis along lines that follow this analytical framework.

--Figure 1: Hypotheses and analytical framework--

4. Research Method

4.1 Summary of survey and samples

We will test the above hypotheses by using data from a follow-up surveys implemented by NEDO in June 2009 (112 responses: a response rate was 100%) and by NEDO and Hitotsubashi University jointly in August 2010 (301 responses: a response rate was 88%). Both follow-up surveys, including the same

questions, are questionnaire surveys for R&D projects at private firms to which NEDO has provided financial assistance. Each questionnaire was sent to a leader of the company who had taken charged of the project in question, which had, in some cases, involved multiple companies. In most cases the leaders answered the questionnaires by themselves. We acknowledged the limitation of data obtained by one person for each questionnaire though the leaders were supposed to have relatively unbiased information for the sample projects that had included 6.6 members on average.

29 respondents answered both surveys, for which we excluded the 2009 responses from the analysis. The resulting 384 samples are divided into four categories: 83 projects that resulted in a product market launch (commercialization) (referred to below as "a product launch"), 159 projects that were implemented but terminated (referred to below as "a project termination"), and 110 projects are continuing R&D within own companies following NEDO supported activities. We also have 32 unavailable responses. For the present study we used the total of 242 samples for either a product launch or a project termination.

Specifically the surveys ask questions, on a project basis, on topics such as the management and performance of the projects, the economic environment and market conditions in which the projects were implemented, and the broad effects on society and the economy as a result of project activities.

Sample characteristics are as follows. The industries that the sample project firms belong to range from automobiles, electronic devices, materials, and chemicals. The size of the firms is between more than 30,000 employees on a consolidated basis to less than 100 employees, with consolidated sales extending from over 2.0 trillion yen to less than 100 million yen. The number of years since establishment ranges between three years to 120 years. Although, in principle, all the NEDO supported projects need to envision commercialization in the future, expectation for that differs from company to company. Firms that had clearly envisaged a product launch at the outset accounted for 64% of the total sample, and

accounted for 74% of the entire sample when firms that succeeded in a product launch without initial plans for commercialization are also included⁴.

4.2 Operationalization

In the following paragraphs we discuss the regression analysis divided into three phases and the structural equation model integrating them in accordance with the analytical framework in Figure 1. First, with regard to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we performed a regression analysis of the influence the extent of dependency on public funds exerts on "the exchange of information with other internal divisions" and "internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility." Next, for Hypothesis 3 (3-1 and 3-2) and Hypothesis 4 (4-1 and 4-2), and for Hypothesis 2, we analyzed the influence "the exchange of information with other internal divisions" and "internal divisions" and "internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility." Next, for Hypothesis 3 (3-1 and 3-2) and Hypothesis 4 (4-1 and 4-2), and for Hypothesis 2, we analyzed the influence "the exchange of information with other internal divisions" and "internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility" exert on the three project results, namely "technological results," "resolution of cost problems" and "acquisition of legitimacy." In addition, we analyzed the influence these three results exert on "commercialization," after taking other factors that affect commercialization into consideration. Finally, by analyzing a series of structural equation models, we verified the cause and effect paths, with product launch and project termination as dependent variables.

The variables used for the analysis are described below. "Percentage of public funds" highlights the extent of dependency on public funds as illustrated by the ratio of funds from NEDO as a share of all R&D expenditures for the project. We defined dependency on NEDO for 50% or more of a project's funding as "high," which we measured as a binary (dummy) variable showing whether it corresponds to "high."

⁴ As discussed below, the effect on the analysis results was not large even when analyzed after excluding the small number of remaining samples that were not expected to be commercialized.

"The exchange of information with other internal divisions" uses a variable to measure the extent of "communications with other (internal) divisions" along a five-point scale. "Internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility" is a synthesis variable (mean value) to measure the extent of implementation of both a "cost analysis by other internal divisions" and a "market analysis by other internal divisions," according to a five-point scale⁵.

According to the hypotheses described above, a development project's results can be understood from the three aspects: "technological results," "resolution of cost problems," and "acquisition of legitimacy." "Technological results" is a synthesis variable used to measure the extent to which technological issues are overcome and development accelerated, and "acquisition of legitimacy" is a synthesis variable used to measure both the extent to which development legitimacy is secured internally and increased external awareness, according a five-point scale (α are 0.68 and 0.75, respectively)⁶. "Resolution of cost problems" is a variable to measure the extent to which cost issues are overcome, using a five-point scale.

With regard to whether a project is commercialized, the sample projects were originally classified into "a product launch" and "a project termination"⁷.

In the specific analytical models we added several control variables. As an alternative hypothesis to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, communications with individuals in other internal divisions can be anticipated to grow, and in-house participation concerning commercial feasibility expected to increase, when there is already a project near the commercialization phase at the outset. Therefore we added

⁵ From the standpoint of accomplishing a project effectively and efficiently, participation by individuals from other internal departments, more than by members in the project, is thought to be more effective for establishing such discipline. In addition, reflecting the cost trend from a profit perspective and the market trend in terms of securing customer needs in achievement of the project is thought to be particularly important for commercialization of the contents. Therefore in the present study we used these two instrumental variables as a means to illustrate the concept of "internal participation for control."

⁶ We included "increased external awareness" in constructing the "acquisition of legitimacy" variable because this reflected the findings in the existing researches indicating the importance that acceptance by individuals outside the company has for the acquisition of legitimacy within organizations [20].

⁷ For these synthesis variables we adopted the mean values for each given variable, but as discussed below the effect on the analysis results is not large even when the factor scores are used.

"number of members responsible for commercialization at the start of the project" and "basic research (a dummy variable to show a project is at the basic research phase at the time of start-up)," to control for proximity to the commercialization phase at the time of project initiation. Furthermore, because the exchange of information with other internal projects can be restricted in order to maintain confidentiality when a project is a collaborative program with another company, we introduced a dummy variable to show a project is a "collaborative project with another company."

Moreover, to eliminate the possibility it will be easy to attain results if there are simply many project members, for Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 we introduced "number of members participating in project" as a control variable.

Finally, we considered the following variables as factors affecting commercialization. First, we recognized changes in a project's external environment through two questions: "Did the economy deteriorate more than expected?" and "Did the business strategy within the organization change and the project diverge from the original orientation after the project had been completed?" Both are dummy variables to show whether the above questions apply.

In addition, we looked at the degree to which the technology developed by the project attracted attention, which also indirectly indicates the competitive environment, by asking, "Has this technology already broadly attracted attention in society and are many firms developing the technology?" That the technology in question had attracted society's attention meant that market growth could be anticipated, but also that appropriating profits might be difficult because the market would be competitive. Therefore it is possible this variable could influence commercialization positively or negatively.

Furthermore, we measured the level of managements' commitment to the projects with the question, "Was this technological development recognized as indispensable for the long-term strategy of the firm?" A firm's final decision-making regarding commercialization can be affected substantially depending on how important the development and the commercialization of the technology are to the firm's long-term strategy.

Descriptive statistics for each of the variables used for the analysis and a correlation matrix are shown in Table 1 below.

--Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlation table--

5. Results of the analyses

5.1 Results of the regression analysis

The results of a multiple regression analysis (OLS) concerning Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are shown in Table 2 below.

From the table we can see that "percentage of public funds" has a significant negative effect both on "communications with other internal divisions" and "internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility." "Number of members responsible for commercialization" has a significant positive effect both on communications with other internal divisions and internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility, as expected. Even after controlling for this effect the negative effects produced by high dependence on public funds remain significant. From these results we can say that both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 were supported.

--Table 2: Multiple regression analysis results: Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2--

The results of a multiple regression analysis (OLS) concerning Hypothesis 3 (3-1, 3-2) and Hypothesis 4 (4-1, 4-2) are shown in Table 3. From the table we can see that "communications with other internal divisions" has significant positive effects on all three performance-indicators, "technological performance," "resolution of cost problems," and "acquisition of legitimacy." Hypothesis 3-1 was thus supported. Beyond our expectation, communications with other internal divisions is effective not only for technical problem solving but also for resolving cost problems.

On the other hand, "internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility" has a significant effect only on "acquisition of legitimacy." Even including this variable separately from "communications with other internal divisions," it affects "technological performance" and "acquisition of legitimacy": contrary to the hypothesis there is no significant effect on "resolutions of cost problems" though a sign for the coefficient is as expected. Thus we can say that Hypothesis 4-1 and Hypothesis 4-2 were only partially supported.

Continuing on, Table 4 shows the results of a binomial logistic regression analysis concerning the effect on "commercialization." "The business strategy within the organization changed and the project diverged from the technology development orientation" has a significant negative effect on commercialization as expected. Contrary to assumption, however, "unexpected deterioration of the economy" has a positive and significant relationship to commercialization. While interpretation of this result is difficult, it perhaps indicates that a project that has reached commercialization is more sensitive to economic trends.

Next, "technological development that is essential for the long-term strategy" has a significant positive effect on commercialization. We can appreciate that high expectations and commitments by management increase the probability of commercialization.

The results, on the other hand, show that, for a technology that "had broadly attracted attention in society and was being developed by many firms," which highlights the market opportunity and competitive environment, the projects tend to be terminated without commercialization. There is a possibility that, when a technology had already attracted intense interest with substantial competition, firms judged it unable to appropriate the profits even if they commercialized the results.

With regard to the relationship between the three project performance variables and "commercialization," all of the performance variables had a significant positive relationship with "commercialization" when being introduced into the model separately. In this respect, we can say that Hypothesis 5 is supported. However, since "technological results," "resolution of cost problems" and "acquisition of legitimacy" are highly correlated, they might be endogenous. In fact, when all three performance variables are introduced into the model simultaneously, the only "technological performance" and "acquisition of legitimacy" positively affect "commercialization." It remains unclear whether this is a statistical bias caused by the high correlation itself or an actual interrelationship. We will take up this point again in the path analysis explored in the following section.

--Table3: Multiple regression analysis results: Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4-

--Table 4: Logistic regression analysis results: Hypothesis 5--

5.2 Examining causal paths: Structural equation model

As shown in the analytical framework in Fig. 1, many of the variables used in the regression analysis

discussed above are endogenous. To test the entire causal paths while taking this point into consideration, we next ran a structural equation models. For the analysis we used the AMOS from SPSS Inc. To keep the model from becoming complex, the control variables introduced into the regression analysis were not incorporated. The analysis results are shown in Fig. 2.

The results of the analysis are consistent with the results of the regression analysis in the preceding section. As the entire model, communications with internal divisions were obstructed when dependence on public funds increases, and the technological performance diminished and commercialization hindered as a result. This suggests the possibility that receiving government funding itself becomes a factor hindering commercialization.

Moreover, the dependency on public funds also negatively affects "internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility." What the diagrams show is that "internal participation related to feasibility" contributes to the "technological performance," regardless of the dependency on public funds. This implies that high dependence on public funds may lead to low technological performance, which lowers probability of commercialization through its negative impact on internal participation on a feasibility study. On the other hand, effects of "internal participation pertaining to commercial feasibility" on "resolution of cost problems" and "acquisition of legitimacy" are not statistically significant through its signs for the coefficients are as hypothesized.

As for the relationship between performance variables and commercialization, the diagram indicates that there are direct effects of "technological performance" and "acquisition of legitimacy" on commercialization, but no direct influence from "resolution of cost problems." It also shows that both "technological results" and "resolution of cost problems" indirectly encourage commercialization through their impacts on "acquisition of legitimacy." Because the three performance variables have a high correlation, however, it seems one should exercise prudence concerning an interpretation in the direction of the cause and effect shown by the model.

--Figure 2: Structural equation model--

6. Discussion

6.1 Contribution and implications of the study

With each country struggling under stringent fiscal conditions, the impact of government funding on private sector R&D also continues to be subjected to greater scrutiny than ever. Given such circumstances, significant effort has been made to strictly measure the effects government funding has on changes in private sector R&D, and the existing researches have understood the effect of government funding on encouraging (or limiting) private sector R&D mainly at an industry, national or similar macro level. The accumulated research a micro-level addressing the question of how the results of private sector R&D projects are affected by the receipt of government funding, on the other hand, remains thin. Based on this awareness, the present study was aimed at supplementing existing research by undertaking an analysis focused on the micro-level process by which government funded projects produce results.

One important finding of this study is that, when viewed at the project level, the act of receiving government funding itself entails some danger of hindering the commercialization of a project's results.

The significance of government funding for private sector R&D lies in the fact it achieves a socially appropriate allocation of R&D resources, by providing support for technologies that are not profitable but which have social value, or by providing support for the development of technologies which, although they are expected to generate considerable economic value in the future, engender risks that private

corporations cannot accept because of the high degree of uncertainty. Viewed from the firm side, because the profitability of the R&D investment is enhanced by the receipt of public funds, government funding enables an enterprise to undertake, from a long-term perspective, R&D activity it had rejected in the past.

The present study also showed that in contrast to this positive aspect of government funding, there is also a negative aspect from a project management standpoint. When public funds are tilted toward private sector R&D activity aimed at commercialization, there is a tendency for project activity to be shut off from the exchange of information with other internal departments. Therefore, compared with the ordinal R&D activity within the firm, the use of internal resources is limited, which has a negative effect on commercialization. We also find that high dependency on government funds tend to prevent a project to receive less involvement of other internal departments pertaining commercial feasibility, which also hinders technological performance.

Because it is an intrinsic problem that originates from the inevitable structure of government funded projects, in which the side providing resources for the R&D activity and the side managing the project toward commercialization are separate, eliminating this problem at its source might be impossible. By recognizing the existence of this problem, however, the supporting side and a firm may be able to adopt various mechanisms to mitigate the problem. From the supporting side it is possible to make an informal appeal, together with an institutional guarantee, so a government funded project receives support from other internal departments. This might include easing restrictions on the sharing of facilities being used by the supported project with other internal divisions. If it earnestly obtains results from a project that receives government funding, and works to tie its results to commercialization, a firm should also be able to appeal formally or informally in a manner that encourages support from in-house.

The analysis results suggested that participation by internal departments in commercial feasibility

promotes the project results and commercialization. If this result is accepted at face value, it means it is important for the supporting side and the firm to encourage other internal divisions to get involved in the commercial feasibility. The danger that excessive involvement concerning commercial feasibility might destroy the autonomy of a project must also be considered, however. The problem of balance with respect to this point will be the focus of future research.

Furthermore, although not a central theme of the present study, it became clear from the analysis in Table 4 that the strategic intent of the firm, or the societal expectations for the development technology and competitive conditions, are critical as factors influencing the success of commercialization. For example, the analysis in the present study showed there is a high probability of commercialization of technological developments that were judged to be essential for the long-term strategy of a firm, and that commercialization is dropped as the result of changes in the orientation of corporate strategy. It also showed that, to the extent society is already broadly aware of a technological development and there is tremendous competition from the very start, results will not be commercialized.

In other words, the success or failure of commercialization appears to be greatly related not only to the process of technological development through the project but also to the position of the project in-house and its competitive position in the market. If such positions are thought to be determined to a certain extent at the start of the project, we can also say that the support project selection will affect the success or failure of commercialization. In other words, the present study suggests that the two considerations necessary for leading the commercialization of government funded projects to success are (1) selecting appropriate support projects and (2) taking actions to ensure support projects are not isolated from other internal departments.

6.2 Limitation and direction for the future study

We believe that by putting the focus on government funded projects and clarifying the mechanism connected with the results at the project level, this study has made a certain contribution to understanding. Nevertheless, there are also limitations as discussed below.

First, if we are to discuss the influence of government funding, a comparison between projects that receive government funding from the start and projects that develop the same kind of technology without receiving any government funding is needed. And in fact, among the existing researches that measure the effect of government funding there does exist some research that prudently performed such matching at the firm level [10], [12], [13], [15]. For the present study focusing on individual projects as the unit of analysis, however, it was extremely difficult to obtain such a match sample. Therefore although the samples were limited to NEDO projects, we decided to comprehend the effect of dependency on government funding by classifying the samples according to dependency on public funds. Using this research methodology, however, meant we could not understand the effect from "receiving or not receiving" government funding. If obtaining a large number of matching samples at the project level is difficult, then we believe that, at a minimum, it will be necessary in the future to supplement the knowledge obtained from the present study by focusing on specific projects and performing a comparative case study with similar private sector R&D projects that have not received government funding.

Finally, although the present study regarded success in the commercialization of the supported project as the final result, given the nature of government funding, the broad spillover effects to society as a whole, including other companies, should also be considered as an important result. Therefore one future direction will be to conduct research that looks at a variety of results indicators.

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


Figure 1 Hypotheses and analytical framework

	Mean	Standard	N	4	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
	value	deviation	IN	1	Z	3	4	0	Ø	1	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. Commercialization ~	0.34	0.48	242														
2. Basic research ~	0.38	0.49	242	088													
3. Number of members responsible for commercialization	2.93	3.73	174	.011	175 [*]												
 Number of members participating in project 	6.61	6.92	242	.145 [*]	152 [*]	.390**											
5. Collaborative project ~	0.49	0.50	242	113	057	002	088										
6. Dependence on public funds ~	0.55	0.50	230	151 [*]	038	.046	.002	.030									
 Communications with other internal departments 	3.33	1.04	242	.198**	088	.195 [*]	.199**	.000	143 [*]								
8. Internal participation pertaining to (commercial) feasibility	2.77	1.06	242	.197**	075	.214**	.172 ^{**}	.012	117	.334**							
 Unexpected deterioration of the economy ~ 	0.10	0.30	225	.073	183**	051	035	.078	025	043	032						
10. Change of business strategy ~	0.11	0.31	225	130	.032	002	014	.160 [*]	.122	131 [*]	105	.161 [*]					
 Indispensable for long-term strategy ~ 	0.13	0.33	242	.322**	176 ^{**}	.135	.174 ^{**}	052	105	.140 [*]	.179**	.062	084				
 Extent of external awareness and competition ~ 	0.14	0.35	242	092	.047	.143	.055	.058	.026	072	.044	046	.111	.059			
13. Technological performance	3.60	0.73	242	.387**	.035	.151 [*]	.159 [*]	056	006	.236**	.173**	.098	181**	.144 [*]	005		
14. Resolution of cost problems	2.89	0.71	242	.310**	019	.102	.168 ^{**}	045	045	.196**	.128 [*]	.082	195**	.147 [*]	.114	.479**	
15. Acquisition of legitimacy	3.47	0.78	241	.364**	055	.124	.159 [*]	109	.080	.264**	.214**	.033	262**	.153 [*]	022	.489**	.412**

 Table 1
 Descriptive statistics and correlation table

Note: *p<0.05, *p<0.01. Dummy variables indicated with a tilde (~).

	Dependent variable						
Independent variable	Communicat	ion with other	Internal participation pertaining				
	internal de	partments	to (commercial) feasibility				
	1	2	3	4			
Constant							
	(25.638)	(24.612)	(18.598)	(17.671)			
Basic research	113	094	079	065			
	(-1.457)	(-1.223)	(-1.008)	(834)			
Number of members responsible for	.174 **	.186 **	.203 ****	.212 ***			
commercialization	(2.234)	(2.425)	(2.609)	(2.733)			
Collaborative project with other	092	086	.014	.019			
companies	(-1.207)	(-1.144)	(.187)	(.246)			
Dependence on public funds		188 **		134 *			
		(-2.485)		(-1.751)			
R ²	.059	.094	.054	.071			
Adjusted R ²	.041	.071	.036	.048			
F	3.359 **	4.144	3.041 **	3.077 **			

Table 2 Multiple regression analysis results: Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2

Note: p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Upper row is the coefficient; lower row () is the t value.

	Dependent variable							
Independent veriable	Techno	ological	Resol	ution of	Acquisition of legitimacy			
Independent variable	perfor	mance	cost p	roblems				
	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Constant								
	(35.584)	(14.110)	(29.194)	(11.687)	(32.092)	(11.726)		
Basic research	.045	.063	009	.004	053	029		
	(.672)	(.957)	(130)	(.065)	(793)	(456)		
Dependence on public funds	005	.033	046	018	.077	.126 **		
	(075)	(.511)	(702)	(272)	(1.169)	(1.976)		
Number of members participating in	.160 **	.111 *	.163 **	.127 *	.146 **	.082		
project	(2.407)	(1.661)	(2.455)	(1.882)	(2.201)	(1.250)		
Communications with other internal		.189 ***		.148 **		.224 ***		
departments		(2.740)		(2.118)		(3.318)		
Internal participation pertaining to		.088		.055		.142 **		
(commercial) feasibility		(1.292)		(.796)		(2.113)		
R ²	.025	.075	.029	.057	.033	.116		
Adjusted R ²	.012	.054	.016	.036	.020	.096		
F	1.961	3.631 ****	2.267 *	2.693 **	2.558 *	5.838 ***		


 Table 3
 Multiple regression analysis results: Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4

Note: p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Upper row is the coefficient; lower row () is the t value.

Independent voriable	Dependent variable						
Independent variable	Commercialization						
Unexpected deterioration of	.185	.284	.464	.071			
the economy	(.119)	(.302)	(.766)	(.017)			
Divergence because of	546	520	466	077			
change in business strategy	(.729)	(.695)	(.531)	(.013)			
Indispensable for long-term	1.815***	1.742****	1.727****	1.825***			
strategy	(12.132)	(12.373)	(12.073)	(11.834)			
Extent of external awareness	-1.199**	-1.305**	-1.052 [*]	-1.235**			
and competition	(4.108)	(5.149)	(3.293)	(4.110)			
Basic research	111	016	.083	073			
	(.105)	(.002)	(.061)	(.043)			
Technological performance	1.449****			1.071***			
	(23.546)			(10.275)			
Resolution of cost problems		.955***		.449			
		(14.289)		(2.537)			
Acquisition of legitimacy			1.219****	.810****			
			(20.113)	(7.833)			
-2logL	229.10	244.365	236.051	216.175			

Table 4	Logistic regression a	analysis results:	Hypothesis 5
	Logiolio rogrocolorre	and yold roould.	

Note: p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Upper row is the coefficient; lower row () is the Wald value.



Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

X ²	χ²/df	GFI	AGFI	CFI	RMSEA
94.443*	3.935	.931	.843	.855	.113
× < 20.05					

Ж	p<0.05

Figure 2 A result of structural equation modeling