Miyagiwa, Kaz: Yunyun (Jiangyun) Wan
『Economics Letters』 Volume 147 October 2016 pp. 5-7 （2016/10/01）
The merger paradox in Cournot oligopoly is revisited in the presence of R&D investment. Two cases are presented in which firms merge profitably without satisfying the 80-percent threshold requirement of Salant et al. (1983).
Wan, Yunyun (Jiangyun)
WP#16-09 一橋大学イノベーション研究センター （2016/08/19）
In the United States, brand-name drug manufacturers often pay generic companies to delay marketing of their generic products. In this paper we develop an analytical framework to examine the implications of banning reverse payment settlements. We first find that reverse payment settlements occur when generic firms face relatively high e…
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Wan, Yunyun(Jiangyun)
WP#16-01 一橋大学イノベーション研究センター （2016/01/13）
Facing generic competition, a brand-name drug company sometimes launches its own generic called an "authorized generic"(AG) through a third-party entity. If an authorized party transfers a substantial part of its profits to the brand-name drug company, the letter's total profit increases as a result and every branded drug that comes of…
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Miyagiwa, Kaz : Yunyun(Jiangyun) Wan
WP#15-21 一橋大学イノベーション研究センター （2015/09/28）
The merger paradox is revisited in the presence of cost-reducing R&D in Cournot oligopoly. Two cases are found, in which merger is profitable without satisfying the 80-percent threshold requirement of Salant et al (1983).
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Wan, Yunyun(Jiangyun) : Kaz Miyagiwa
WP#15-18 一橋大学イノベーション研究センター （2015/08/25）
This paper presents a model of generic entry competition that captures salient features of the Hatch-Waxman Act, enacted with two incompaible objectives of restoring inc…
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